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“Light But Not White”: A Race/Plus Model of 
Latina/o Subordination 
Alfredo Mirandé* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper grew out of the LatCrit Conference held in Chicago, Illinois, 
on October 3rd through 5th in 2013, the theme of which was “Resistance 
Rising: Theorizing and Building Cross-Sector Movements.” The subject of 
the paper, however, extends well beyond the conference theme and falls 
within the first of five standing guideposts for LatCrit scholarship, which 
focuses on “the multiple dimensionality of Latina/o identity and its 
relationship to current legal, political, and cultural regimes or practices.”1 
“Light but Not White” is based on data derived from a larger study of 
transnational migration between Jalostotitlán (“Jalos”) in Jalisco, México, 
and Turlock, California, that seeks to integrate the study of race and 
immigration. While a detailed discussion of the findings of the larger study 
is beyond the scope of this paper, my goal here is to offer a critique of the 
prevailing Black/White racial binary in law and sociology and propose a 
new race/plus theoretical paradigm for understanding not only the 
experiences of Jalos migrants, but also Latina/o2 identity, Equal Protection 
                                                                                                                     
* Alfredo Mirandé is a professor of Sociology and Ethnic Studies at the University of 
California, Riverside. Funding for this research was made possible by a research grant 
from UC Mexus and by the Academic Senate of the University of California, Riverside. 
1 LatCrit 2013 Call for Papers, LATCRIT http://www.latcrit.org/content/conferences/ 
latcrit-biennial-conferences/latcrit-2013/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). 
2 I will be using the terms, Mexican, Latina/o, and Chicana/o throughout the paper. 
Mexican obviously refers to persons of Mexican descent and the focus of the larger study 
was on Mexican migration to the United States. Latina/o is a more inclusive term used to 
refer to Mexicanos and other persons from Latino América. While my focus is on 
Mexican migration, the findings have important implications for other Spanish-speaking  
communities in the United States. Finally, the word Chicana/o is a more political term 
that is used to refer to people of Mexican descent who are residing in the United States on 
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doctrine, and the anti-subordination principle. This new race/plus paradigm 
proposes that, while Jalos migrants and other Latinas/os are subjected to 
race-based discrimination and subordination, they also experience 
discrimination based on language, culture, and real or putative alienage 
status. 
Consistent with the underlying principles of Latino Critical Race 
(“LatCrit”) scholarship and Critical Race Theory (“CRT”), I seek to put the 
study of race at the center of both legal analysis and sociological theory 
while at the same time challenging the prevailing Black/White racial binary. 
Although there has been a strong interest in the study of race in sociology, 
much of the past sociological research has adopted a Black/White racial 
binary model that ignores the experiences of Latinos, Asians, and other 
groups that do not fit the binary model.3 Within law, on the other hand, 
because of the plenary power of Congress over immigration, the study of 
race and Equal Protection and the study of alienage have been doctrinally 
bifurcated. As a result, both within sociology and law, there is a dire need to 
integrate the study of race and the study of immigration/alienage, and to 
adopt multidisciplinary perspectives that eschew simplistic binary views 
and recognize the complexity of race and ethnicity in contemporary society. 
Finally, this study of transnational migration between Jalos and Turlock 
examines an important and relatively neglected question regarding the role 
that race, or skin color and complexion, may play in explaining the relative 
success of some Latino immigrants in the United States. In addition to their 
social, human, and cultural capital, which includes their strong work ethic, 
                                                                                                                     
a relatively permanent basis and who have been denied basic cultural and citizenship 
rights. 
3 See, e.g., NATALIA MOLINA, HOW RACE IS MADE IN AMERICA: IMMIGRATION, 
CITIZENSHIP, AND THE HISTORICAL POWER OF RACIAL SCRIPTS (2013); Robert S. Chang 
& Neil Gotanda, The Race Question in LatCrit Theory and Asian American 
Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 1012, 1014–15 (2007); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary 
Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 
1213, 1215 (1997). 
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people from Jalos and the Los Altos de Jalisco region tend to be relatively 
fair and light complexioned. It is, therefore, important to examine the 
possible advantages of being light-skinned as a form of social capital that 
might facilitate their success. 
The paper begins with a discussion of the racial binary and the 
antidiscrimination principle, and then presents a brief overview of the 
sample, data, and qualitative methods used in the underlying study. The 
paper then turns to an examination of some of the factors that might help to 
promote the relative labor market success of Jalos migrants and their strong 
identification with their community of origin. I then turn to a discussion of 
prevailing conceptions of race in law and sociology, the social construction 
of Whiteness, and White privilege in the United States. I conclude by 
introducing the race/plus model and noting that, while people from Jalos are 
relatively light in complexion, they are not accepted as White and are 
subjected not only to racial discrimination but to discrimination based on 
language, culture, and real or perceived immigration status. The final 
section applies the race/plus model to relevant case law in various areas, 
including jury exclusion, language-based employment discrimination, 
educational segregation, and racial profiling and Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure border stops. 
II. THE RACIAL BINARY AND THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
The Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection doctrine, and 
antidiscrimination principles in American jurisprudence are derived largely 
from the history of slavery and the attempt to eliminate the vestiges of 
slavery and racial animus that had been directed against African Americans 
during reconstruction.4 In what was to become a classic statement on Civil 
Rights and the Equal Protection doctrine, Paul Brest describes the 
                                                                                                                     
4 See generally Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976). 
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antidiscrimination principle as a “general principle disfavoring 
classifications and other decisions and practices that depend on race (or 
ethnic origin) of the parties affected.” 5  The historical and doctrinal 
development of the “antidiscrimination principle” can be traced to the post-
Civil War Amendments to the Constitution.6 A century after the Civil War, 
our nation was committed to the antidiscrimination principle. Of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, only the Fifteenth explicitly embodied this 
commitment. In the Civil Rights Act of 1866, however, Congress read the 
antidiscrimination principle into the Thirteenth Amendment, and the 
Supreme Court has constructed the amorphous language of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to hold that racial 
classifications are “constitutionally suspect” and subject to “the most rigid 
scrutiny.”7 
Brest agues, moreover, that doctrinal acceptance of the antidiscrimination 
principle is difficult, given that “the text and history of the [Equal 
Protection C]lause are vague and ambiguous and cannot, in any event, 
infuse the antidiscrimination principle with the moral force or justify its 
extension to novel circumstances or new beneficiaries.”8 He believes we 
should adopt the principle disfavoring racial or ethnic classifications, 
irrespective of the actual intent of the framers, because it is derived from 
widely accepted notions of equality, which are generally accepted in the 
society.9 Although Brest uses the word “race” as shorthand for race and 
ethnic origin, he notes that the antidiscrimination principle can be extended 
to include a variety of other traits, such as alienage, illegitimacy, and sex.10 
In this paper, I seek to follow Brest’s lead by extending the 
antidiscrimination principle and Equal Protection doctrine to “novel 
                                                                                                                     
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. (citations omitted). 
8 Id. at 5. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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circumstances and new beneficiaries” by applying the principle to the 
Latina/o experience in contemporary society with not only racial 
discrimination, but also discrimination based on language, culture, and real 
or putative alienage and immigration status. 
III. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The underlying research for this article began nearly a decade ago, after I 
obtained a UC Mexus–CONACYT grant to study transnational migration to 
the United States and its impact on gender, community, and identity.11 I 
selected the city of Jalostotitlán (“Jalos”) as the final research site in 
Mexico because it is in a region, Los Altos de Jalisco, which has a long 
history of migration to the United States, dating to the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Most men and a plurality of women from Jalos migrate 
to the United States at some point in their lives—some as early as ages 14 
or 15. 
Turlock, California was selected as the point of destination for Jalos 
migrants and the counterpart research site on the US side of the border. 
Migrants from Jalos are concentrated in several communities in California, 
including Anaheim, Oakland, Sacramento, and Los Angeles. Turlock 
seemed like an ideal comparison site because there is a great deal of 
migration from Jalos there and because it is an agricultural community 
roughly the same size as Jalos. Finally, more than a decade ago Turlock 
sought to extend the Jalos custom of honoring the town’s Patron Saint, La 
Virgen de la Asunción (Virgin of the Assumption), on August 15th by 
establishing their own celebration for the Virgen. 
                                                                                                                     
11 A special thanks to UC Mexus (the University of California Institute for Mexico and 
the United States) and Mexico’s CONACYT (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y 
Tecnologia) for providing the funding that made this study possible. In the initial phases 
of the research in Jalostotitlán, Mexico, I benefited greatly from a productive 
collaboration with Dr. Nelson Minello, a sociologist who was my Mexican counterpart on 
the UC Mexus and the CONACYT grants. 
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A Mexican colleague provided the name and contact information of an 
anthropologist, Professor Xavier Glass, 12  who was not only thoroughly 
acquainted with the history, political-economy, and culture of the area, but 
also well respected, connected to many people in the community, and 
willing and eager to talk and to support the research. Initial contacts in Jalos 
were made through “social notables,” such as Dr. Glass, the assistant mayor 
of Jalostotitlán, and Elvira, a young woman who worked at a local 
electronics and souvenir shop in the center of town. 
An important source for establishing networks and making contacts with 
people in Turlock were social notables identified by Elvira, as well as the 
Catholic Parish of El Sagrado Corazón (Sacred Heart). I was able to meet 
and interview not only several of the parish priests, but also parishioners, 
including Lola Olmedo, the woman largely responsible for establishing the 
Turlock celebration for the Virgen.13 
The findings of the larger study were based on a wide range of qualitative 
research methods, including participant observation, ethnographic field 
research, archival research, and in-depth personal interviews conducted on 
both sides of the border in Jalos and Turlock. Interviewees included 
ordinary citizens, as well as priests, school principals, psychologists, and 
social service providers. Finally, focus group interviews were carried out 
with youth in the respective communities, one in Turlock and three in Jalos. 
The Turlock focus group consisted of 15 to 17 year-old youth. One of the 
Jalos focus groups involved students at CONALEP, a technical high school 
that prepares its students for work in trades, such as auto mechanics, 
electrical maintenance, and welding. The second consisted of students at the 
                                                                                                                     
12 I have opted to use pseudonyms to protect the privacy and to maintain the 
confidentiality of my respondents, most of whom came to the United States “sin 
papeles” (without papers). 
13 Interview with Xavier Glass, professor, Jalostotitlán, Jalisco, Mex., Aug. 12, 2006. 
Interview with Father Patricio, priest, Jalostotitlán, Jalisco, Mex., Feb. 18, 2007. 
Interview with Father Rogelio, priest, Jalostotitlán, Jalisco, Mex., Feb. 18, 2007. 
Interview with Father Marcos, priest, Jalostotitlán, Jalisco, Mex., Feb. 20, 2007. 
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Prepa, or college preparatory school in Jalos, who came from more middle 
and upper class families. A final focus group was conducted with a class of 
kindergarten children in Jalos.14 The total sample for the study included 
approximately 40 persons in Jalos and 45 in Turlock. 
The interviews were open-ended and consisted of several broad 
questions, including where the person was born and raised, his or her 
background, and demographic information such as parents’ level of 
education and occupation, number of siblings, and birth order in the family. 
There were also questions about how his or her parents got along and who 
exercised the most control in the family. Other topics included noviazago 
(courtship) and other dating rituals, decision-making in the family, concepts 
of masculinity, gender roles, attitudes toward child-rearing, perceptions of 
the major problems facing the community and/or youth, and relations 
between ausentes (migrants) and Jalos residents. 
When interviewing the Turlock sample, a great deal of attention was 
devoted to the migration process, social networks, and how life changes in 
the United States for migrants from Jalos and their families. The Turlock 
youth focus group was conducted bilingually. All of the other interviews 
and focus groups were conducted exclusively in Spanish and then 
translated. I also translated passages from Spanish language publications as 
needed. 
                                                                                                                     
14 The group was made up of approximately eight children. After the session ended, the 
teacher led the children into a room that had different work or learning cubicles and 
activities for various vocations, such as grocery, carpentry, science, and beauty salon. 
Caesar, a boy that dominated the focus group, went to the grocery store and immediately 
took charge of the cash register and play money, whereas other children took shopping 
carts and started shopping for food. Not surprisingly, virtually all of the girls rushed to 
the beauty salon center and started playing with wigs, putting on make-up, and using toy 
hair dryers. This suggests that even at an early age, children’s occupational choices and 
predispositions are clearly structured along traditional gender lines. It also reinforces the 
common belief that Jalos girls are “girlie” and feminine. Sadly, none of the children were 
drawn into the science center with play microscopes and other scientific paraphernalia. 
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Although most Jalos migrants had little or no education and limited 
proficiency in English, one of the major findings of the study is that many, 
particularly members of the older or pioneering generation, had a very 
strong work ethic and were remarkably successful in the United States. 
Although not the focus of this paper, one of the goals of the larger study 
was to isolate factors, such as social or cultural capital, that might help to 
explain or account for this relative success. 
IV. FACTORS PROMOTING JALOS MIGRANTS LABOR MARKET 
SUCCESS: AN OVERVIEW 
 One of the most salient factors found to promote the labor market 
success of people from Jalos in the United States, as well as their strong 
Jalos identity, was their affiliation with religion and the Catholic Church, 
which constitutes social, cultural, and human capital for residents. Two 
religious-based Jalos fiestas, the celebration for La Virgen de la Asunción in 
August and Carnaval on the eve of Lent in late February or early March, 
contain important ceremonies and rituals that unite people in the community 
and reinforce a collective consciousness and pride in “being from Jalos.” In 
other words, the fiestas reinforce identification with the community and the 
sense of a collective origin, awareness, and pride.15  Significantly, one of 
the days in the Jalos fiestas and a special mass are devoted to los ausentes. 
Ausentes, as opposed to presentes, are people who have left the community 
and whose children and descendants are now in the United States. The 
fiestas also provide an important opportunity for ausentes to display their 
visible symbols of material success such as shiny new pick-up trucks, sports 
utility vehicles (SUVs), electronic devices, and other manifestations of their 
purchasing and consumption patterns. 
These rituals also reinforce the success stories of the numerous migrants 
who have traveled to the United States, and they serve as network-creating 
                                                                                                                     
15 Alfredo Mirandé, Toribio Romo, el Padre Pollero, 38 AZTLÁN: J. OF CHICANO STUD. 
95, 95–96 (2013). 
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and network-maintaining mechanisms for people who wish to migrate to the 
United States. In addition, even after people migrate to a foreign country 
and are exposed to a new culture and language, the Catholic Church 
continues to serve as a constant source of stability and support for new 
arrivals. 
Identification with the Church is greatly facilitated by the presence of 
Latino priests and by Spanish-language masses and catechism classes, 
together with the fact that the majority of the parishioners in the Sacred 
Heart Parish in Turlock are Spanish speakers and most are from Jalos. 
Additionally, with the inauguration of the celebration for the Virgen de La 
Asunción in Turlock, the community members have come full circle in 
bringing a little bit of Jalos to Turlock and transforming La Virgen into a  
transnational icon in Mexico and the United States, so that Jalos identity can 
be maintained and reinforced in both countries, or in a unique third space.16 
Even more pronounced is the emergence of El Padre Toribio 17  as a 
transnational icon who performs many miracles for migrants and 
undocumented workers, without borders or limits. 
      Family, friendship, church social networks, and social capital are all 
important factors in promoting identification with Jalos and the labor 
market success of the Jalos community. One of the unique features of the 
study is that it examined the creation and maintenance of a transnational 
identity and community among persons who self-identify as being “from 
Jalos,” regardless of their birthplace, citizenship, or residence.18 I contend 
                                                                                                                     
16 See Roger Rouse, Mexican Migration and the Social Space of Postmodernism, in 
BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 247–259 
(David G. Gutiérrez ed., 1996). 
17 Toribo Romo, a young Mexican priest and Saint born outside of Jalos, was killed by 
the Mexican government during the Cristero War and became one of the Cristero Martyrs 
in the 1920s. In recent years, he has emerged in Mexican border folklore as a mysterious 
stranger who miraculously appears at or near the border and helps people in distress, 
sometimes not only giving them food and water but even helping them across the border 
into the United States. Mirandé, supra note 15, at 95. 
18 Id. at 96. 
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Jalos is a community that originated in the town of Jalostotitlán, Jalisco, but 
has become an international community without borders. 19  It is a 
community, “unified by religion, language, customs, rituals, tastes, and the 
like” and “integrated at the micro-level by kinship systems and primordial 
loyalties.”20  
 The findings of the larger study are consistent with other research 
pointing to the importance of social networks and social capital in 
explaining a continuous pattern of migration. James Coleman, for example, 
maintains that “social capital is created when the relations among persons 
change in ways that facilitate action.”21 Although social ties of friendship 
and kinship in and of themselves provide few advantages to people seeking 
to migrate, once a person from one’s social network has migrated, these ties 
become a resource that can be drawn upon to gain access to foreign 
employment and all that is associated with such employment. 22  Most 
migrants from Jalos to Turlock have family or friends in the area who 
greatly facilitate not only finding employment, housing, places to shop for 
food, and schools, but also making the transition in general to a new country 
and culture.23 Social networks with family and friends reinforce not only a 
strong identification with Jalos but also a worldview that includes a belief in 
the American Dream. However, rather than focusing on individual success, 
the American Dream is viewed as a collective enterprise. 
                                                                                                                     
19 Other studies have pointed to the existence of transnational communities without 
borders. See, e.g., MANUEL BARAJAS, THE XARIPU COMMUNITY ACROSS BORDERS: 
LABOR MIGRATION, COMMUNITY, AND FAMILY (2009); ROBERT COURTNEY SMITH, 
MEXICAN NEW YORK: TRANSNATIONAL LIVES OF NEW IMMIGRANTS (2006). 
20 See generally RUBEN GOWRICH, CARIBBEAN TRANSNATIONALISM: MIGRATION, 
PLURALIZATION, AND SOCIAL COHESION (2006). 
21 JAMES COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 304 (1990). 
22 Marcela Cerrutti & Douglas S. Massey, Trends in Mexican Migration to the United 
States, 1965 to 1995, in CROSSING THE BORDER: RESEARCH FROM THE MEXICAN 
MIGRATION 19 (Jorge Durand & Douglas S. Massey eds., 2004). 
23 Mirandé, supra note 15, at 96. 
"Light But Not White": A Race/Plus Model of Latina/o Subordination  957 
VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 3 • 2014 
The first generatin of Jalos migrants to Turlock and other communities in 
the United States set the stage for and facilitated the migration of 
subsequent migrants.24 Most people who migrate to Turlock already had 
family and/or friends in the community, and these social networks greatly 
facilitated their integration into the new culture and language, providing 
help and support in finding housing, schools, grocery shopping, and 
employment. 
 According to Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, once certain 
members of a community migrate, migration becomes self-sustaining, as 
migrants are successful in transmitting new information about economic 
opportunities and the migration process that facilitates the migration of 
others.25 In a study of 822 adult, male Mexican immigrants who arrived at 
two Texas ports of entry on the border, Portes and Robert Bach found that 
over 90 percent of the respondents had obtained legal residence through 
family and employee connections.26 Douglas S. Massey and his associates 
also found that social networks accounted for the migration patterns of 19 
Mexican communities where migration was classified as normative.27 They 
noted that “the act of migration not only induces changes within individual 
migrants that make further movement more likely, it also initiates changes 
in social structures that spread migration through the community.” 28
 Pedro López, one of the Turlock social notables I interviewed, 
commented on the importance of social networks.29 He said that people 
from Jalos got together at the Church of the Sacred Heart in Turlock and 
                                                                                                                     
24 SMITH, supra note 19, at 21. 
25 ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 
356–57 (3rd ed. 2006). 
26 See generally ALEJANDRO PORTES & ROBERT L. BACH, LATIN JOURNEY: CUBAN AND 
MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1985). 
27 See Douglas S. Massey, et al., Continuities in Transnational Migration: An Analysis of 
Nineteen Mexican Communities, 99 AM. J. SOC. 1492 (1994). 
28 Id. at 1500. 
29 In person interview with Pedro López, a community member in Turlock, Turlock, Cal. 
(June 14, 2007). 
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that the Church was “flooded” with people from Jalos.30 Pedro added that 
people like his father and other persons from Jalos who first settled in 
Turlock “gave a lot of support to many of their fellow countrymen, people 
from the town [of Jalos], they established family bases here, and this is how 
a large community is established.”31 
Other factors facilitating the economic success of Jalos migrants to 
Turlock are the labor skills and social and human capital that they bring 
with them. As noted, Jalos and Turlock are similar in the sense that they are 
both small, but rapidly growing, relatively isolated, rural communities 
dominated by agriculture and dairy farming.32 Many Jalos residents bring 
marketable skills and knowledge with them, which helps them find 
employment and succeed. Juan Pérez, for example, grew up on a ranch near 
Jalos and has always worked in agriculture. Although dairy farming is much 
more mechanized in the United States, Juan got his job as a fiador (feeder) 
on a local dairy farm outside of Turlock because of the skills and experience 
that he had working in dairies.33 Rosa Fuentes’s husband is a fiador at the 
same farm, but he worked as a bricklayer and in construction in Mexico. He 
got his job at the dairy through friends from Jalos who showed him how to 
do the work a little bit at a time and ultimately recommended him for the 
job.34 
 In order to contextualize the major findings of the larger study, in the 
next section I will provide a brief overview of the existing literature on 
immigration and race. As previously noted, most of the existing literature 
on race has emanated from a Black/White binary model. Studies of 
immigration, on the other hand, have historically tended to either ignore or 
                                                                                                                     
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Mirandé, supra note 15, at 96. 
33 In person interview with Juan Pérez a fiador who worked at a dairy outside Turlock, 
Turlock, Cal. (June 12, 2007). 
34 In person Interview with Rosa Fuentes, Turlock, Cal. (June 14, 2007). 
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neglect race. In this article, I seek to address this void by integrating the 
study of immigration and race. 
V. “BRINGING RACE BACK IN”: INTEGRATING THEORIES OF 
IMMIGRATION AND RACE  
Immigration and alienage has been of considerable interest within not 
only law, but also anthropology, economics, political science, and 
sociology. In law, the focus has been largely on case law and constitutional 
issues surrounding alienage, as well as race and equal protection. Until 
recently, there has been little interest in studying how race impacts 
immigration and citizenship status. Similarly, there has been a void in the 
social sciences between scholars who study race and those who study 
immigration. 
Although there is strong interest in the study of race in sociology, much 
of the past sociological research adopted a Black/White racial binary model 
that ignored or neglected the experiences of Latinos, Asians, and other 
groups that do not fit the binary model.35 The study of alienage and the 
plenary power of Congress over immigration, on the one hand, and the 
study of race and Equal Protection doctrine, on the other, have been 
doctrinally bifurcated.36 As a result, both within sociology and within law, 
there is a dire need to integrate the study of race and the study of 
immigration/alienage, and to adopt multidisciplinary perspectives that 
eschew simplistic binary views and recognize the complexity of race and 
ethnicity in contemporary society. 
Perhaps the most significant and challenging development in the study of 
race and ethnicity over the past 30 years has been the emergence of many 
new theoretical paradigms and perspectives. In addition to postmodernism 
                                                                                                                     
35 See Perea, supra note 3. 
36 Id. 
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and cultural studies theory, new paradigms and perspectives include CRT 
and LatCrit37 as well as cultural citizenship perspectives.38 
CRT, for example, is a movement in law that emerged in the 1980s that 
puts race at the center of legal analysis. It has been appropriated and applied 
in education, sociology, and other social sciences. Francisco Valdés, Jerome 
McCristal Culp, and Angela P. Harris, for example, have pointed out that 
CRT challenges three basic beliefs about racial justice in the United 
States. 39  The first and most persistent of these beliefs is that “race 
blindness” will eventually eliminate racism.40 The second belief, identified 
by Valdés, Culp, and Harris as being challenged by CRT, is that race is a 
matter of individual prejudice rather than of systemic racism.41 The third 
and final belief challenged by CRT, according to these authors, is that one 
can fight racism while at the same time ignoring sexism, homophobia, and 
other forms of oppression.42 In sum, CRT puts race at the center of legal 
analysis, rejects the color-blind approach to legal scholarship, and sees 
racism as systemic and endemic in contemporary society. It concludes that 
one cannot hope to eliminate racism without simultaneously addressing 
sexism, homophobia, and other forms of oppression.43 
Within sociology, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, a Puerto Rican sociologist and 
leading theorist in the field, has similarly been critical of prevailing, 
simplistic sociological theories of race and racism that are based on 
                                                                                                                     
37 See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE 
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000). See supra notes 
1–2. 
38 See. e.g. LATINO CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: CLAIMING IDENTITY, SPACE, AND RIGHTS 
(William V. Flores & Rina Benmayor eds., 1997). 
39 Francisco Valdes et al., Battles Waged, Won, and Lost: Critical Race Theory at the 
Turn of the Millenium, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, 1 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002). 
40 Id. at 1. 
41 Id. at 1–2. 
42 Id. at 2. 
43 Id. 
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psychological or social-psychological conceptualizations and sees racism as 
endemic to society. 44  Contrary to such ideational approaches to race, 
Bonilla-Silva advances a structural theory of race, which, like CRT, posits 
that racism is inherent in social systems, rather than in the ideologies of the 
members of these social systems.45 He also dismisses Marxist and neo-
Marxist theories, such as Edna Bonacich’s split labor market theory, which 
give primacy to the concept of class over race and interpret racism as an 
ideological product of class dynamics.46 Although other theorists, such as 
Mario Barrera, Robert Blauner, Michael Omi, and Howard Winant, have 
proposed non-ideational conceptions of racism, Bonilla-Silva argues they 
fall short of developing a structural explanation. 47  In short, prevailing 
sociological theories of race tend to understand racism in terms of overt 
individual behavior and exclude racism that emanates from within the 
structure of the social system. 48  Bonilla-Silva concludes by noting that 
extant theories in the social sciences tend to view racism in a circular 
manner, so “racism is a belief that produces behavior, which is itself 
racism.”49  He believes social scientists should eschew social and social 
psychological views of racism and proposes an alternative framework that 
focuses on racialized social systems.50 
VI. “LIGHT BUT NOT WHITE”: A NEW RACE/PLUS PARADIGM  
This study of transnational migration between Jalos and Turlock seeks to 
integrate race and alienage by addressing an important and neglected 
question: What role does race, or skin color and complexion, play in the 
                                                                                                                     
44 See generally Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural 
Interpretation, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 465 (1996). 
45 Id. at 469. 
46 Id. at 466. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 467. 
49 Id. at 469. 
50 Id. 
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relative success of certain Jalos migrants? In addition to their social, human, 
and cultural capital, which includes a very strong work ethic, people from 
Los Altos de Jalisco tend to be relatively fair and light-complexioned. The 
possible advantages of being light-skinned need to be acknowledged as a 
potential form of social capital.51 Although some respondents, including 
Father Gustavo, one of the priests at the Turlock parish,52 thought that, 
although people from Jalos are on average not as light as most people from 
the larger region of Los Altos de Jalisco, they are unquestionably fairer than 
most Mexican migrants. However, I submit that it would be a mistake to 
conclude that people from Jalos are “White,” with all of the advantages of 
White privilege in the United States. Given the history of slavery and the 
prevailing rule of hypodescent53 in defining race in the United States, I 
contend that it is one thing to be “light” and quite another to be accepted as 
“White“ and accorded all of the rights and privileges associated with 
“Whiteness.”54 
In White by Law, Ian Haney López examines how Whiteness has been 
defined and socially constructed by law. After looking at how the courts in 
the United States have historically defined “Whiteness” López identifies 
two dominant rationales or views of race: one that appeals to “common 
knowledge” and one that is based on “scientific evidence.” 55  Although 
courts initially used both views of race in their efforts to define Whiteness, 
                                                                                                                     
51 See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). 
52 Interview with Father Gustavo León (pseudonym), Pastor, Sacred Heart of Jesus 
Parish, in Turlock, Cal. (June 12, 2007). 
53 See, e.g., Neil Gotanda. A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind”, in CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 257 (Kimberlé 
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). The Rule of Hypodescent is also known as the “one-drop” 
rule, so that if a person is any part Black he or she is defined as Black, whereas in Latino 
América and the Caribbean, if a person is any part White, that person is likely to be 
considered White. Id. at 258. 
54 See, e.g., PAULA S. ROTHENBERG, WHITE PRIVILEGE: ESSENTIAL READINGS ON THE 
OTHER SIDE OF RACISM (2002); JEAN HALLEY ET AL., SEEING WHITE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO WHITE PRIVILEGE AND RACE (2011). 
55 IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 3 (2006). 
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they became increasingly frustrated by scientific “manipulation” that 
ignored racial differences by reportedly including in the category of 
Caucasian “far more [people] than the unscientific mind suspects.”56 As a 
result, the courts turned increasingly to so-called “common knowledge” as a 
justification for racial classifications. The Supreme Court concluded that 
“the words ‘free [W]hite persons’ are words of common speech, to be 
interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man.”57 
Haney López concludes that the construction of a positive “White” identity 
is ultimately not a scientific category but a hierarchical conception that 
requires inferior minority identities.58 He argues that what is called for to 
counter this conception of Whiteness is a deconstruction and rejection of 
White identity and White privilege.59 López contends that White people 
must overcome “transparency” in order to fully appreciate the salience of 
race to their identity.60 They should do so, however, with the intention of 
consciously repudiating “Whiteness” as it is currently constituted.61 
What is clear from Haney López’s discussion of the social and legal 
construction of Whiteness is that, while light-skinned Mexicanas/os and 
Latinas/os may be favored over dark-skinned ones, they are not considered 
“White,” as that would entail their full acceptance into the in-group of 
privileged Whites. “Whiteness,” after all, is ultimately not a racial 
classification but a socially constructed one.62 Haney López suggests that 
White identity is defined by the “othering” of non-Whites.63 Whites exist as 
a category of people, subject to a double negative: They are those who are 
not non-White.64 
                                                                                                                     
56 Id. at 6. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 132–33. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 7. 
63 Id. at 19–20. 
64 Id. at 20. 
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Using data from the New Immigrant Survey, a major collaborative and 
long-running research study of new legal immigrants to the United States, 
Reanne Frank, Ilana Redstone Akresh, and Bo Lu found that Latino 
immigrants in the United States understand the privileges associated with a 
“White” racial designation, but they also understand that the larger society 
is not generally willing to grant them this designation.65 Additionally, they 
found that darker-skinned Latino immigrants experienced increased color-
based racial discrimination relative to their annual income.66 
While we should continue to work toward developing a structural theory 
of racism, as suggested by CRT theorists and Bonilla-Silva, we must also 
recognize that in addition to overt racism, Latinos/as in the United States, 
including Jalos migrants, are subjected to a great deal of discrimination that 
is ostensibly race neutral and at the same time legally sanctioned. Therefore, 
it is important to develop what I term a “race/plus model,” which takes into 
account not only intentional, institutional, and “common sense” racism,67 
but also other forms of racism and discrimination that are not directly based 
on race. In the next section, I present a new race/plus theoretical model of 
discrimination, which recognizes that Latinos are subjected not only to 
racial discrimination, but also to discrimination based on language, culture, 
and real or perceived immigration status. 
VII. APPLICATION OF THE RACE/PLUS MODEL  
The focus on race and the racial binary in the antidiscrimination principle 
and in Equal Protection jurisprudence is consistent with the prevailing 
liberal view of equality. This view contends that “discrete and insular 
minorities are those whose subordination is based on immutable 
                                                                                                                     
65 See generally Reanne Frank et al., Latino Immigrants and the U.S. Racial Order: How 
and Where Do They Fit in?, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 378 (2010). 
66 Id. 
67 IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 108 
(2003). 
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characteristics like race and skin color.”68 But it is more difficult to address 
discrimination based on other traits like language, which are presumed to be 
more mutable than race.69 I am not suggesting here that race and skin color 
are not important bases of discrimination for these groups; they are 
important. I am suggesting that, in addition to racial discrimination, 
Latinas/os and other non-English-speaking, immigrant groups are subjected 
to language and accent discrimination.70 Also, regardless of their citizenship 
or immigration status, Mexicans are often perceived as “foreign” or alien, 
and discrimination based on so-called “Mexican appearance” is not only 
legally enforced, but also socially sanctioned. 
Legal precedents in diverse areas such as jury selection, discrimination in 
employment, segregation of Mexican students, and the Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures demonstrate the 
limitation of the extant binary model that prohibits racial discrimination, but 
directly and indirectly condones discrimination based on language and real 
or perceived immigration status.71 
A. Discrimination in Jury Selection 
One of the first cases where the US Supreme Court applied the 
antidiscrimination principle was in the 1879 case of Strauder v. West 
Virginia. 72  The Court held that a West Virginia statute barring colored 
citizens from jury service and limiting jury service to White males, 21 years 
of age and older was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
                                                                                                                     
68 Alfredo Mirandé, “Revenge of the Nerds,” or Postmodern “Colored Folk”?: Critical 
Race Theory and the Chronicles of Rodrigo, 4 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 153, 193 (2000). 
69 Id. 
70 See., e.g, Fragante v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(upholding the dismissal of Manuel Fragante’s employment discrimination suit after he 
applied for a clerk’s job and was not selected for the position despite scoring highest of 
721 persons taking the civil service exam because of a perceived deficiency in relevant 
oral communication skills caused by his “heavy Filipino accent”). 
71 Space limitations preclude an extended discussion of the relevant case law. 
72 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879). 
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Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, unconstitutional. In Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins,73 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
confined to the protection of Black citizens and extended the constitutional 
protection to permanent or temporary residents from China. 
While Strauder prohibited racial discrimination in the jury composition, 
it was not until nearly 75 years later, in Hernandez v. Texas,74 in the same 
term as the historic Brown v. Board of Education desegregation decision, 
that the Court extended the protection of Strauder to Mexicans. For the first 
time, the Court challenged the racial binary in holding in Hernandez v. 
Texas that people of Mexican origin constituted a distinct, legally 
cognizable entity, separate and apart from Whites and Blacks and subject to 
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.75 The Court ruled that it was a 
denial of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause to try a 
defendant, like Pete Hernandez before a jury where all persons of his race or 
ancestry have, because of that race or ethnicity, been excluded by the 
State.76 
Almost 40 years later however, the Supreme Court in Hernandez v. New 
York77 would turn Hernandez v. Texas on its head by upholding the use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude bilingual Spanish-speaking jurors from a 
jury pool during voir dire examination. These exclusions were ostensibly 
not based on race or language, but on the fact that the prosecution was not 
convinced that Spanish-speaking jurors could abide by the official 
translation provided by the court interpreters and thus offered a race-neutral 
explanation for dismissing the jurors.78 
Dionisio Hernandez petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the New 
York State Supreme Court’s rejection of his claim that the prosecutor in his 
                                                                                                                     
73 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). 
74 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954). 
75 Id. at 480. 
76 Id. at 482. 
77 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
78 Id. at 360. 
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criminal trial exercised peremptory challenges to exclude Latinos79 from the 
jury because of their ethnicity, arguing that the prosecutor’s discriminatory 
use of peremptory strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause.80 In Batson 
v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the use of race to exclude jurors 
during voir dire was impermissible and a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.81 Using Batson’s three-step process for determining whether the 
prosecution had used peremptory challenges in a way that violated the 
Equal Protection Clause, 82  the Court had to determine whether the 
prosecutor offered a race-neutral basis for challenging Latino potential 
jurors and, if so, whether the state court’s decision to accept the 
prosecutor’s explanation should be sustained.83 
Hernandez argued that Spanish-language ability is inextricably linked to 
ethnicity, and that, as a result, it is a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause to exercise peremptory challenges to exclude Latino potential jurors 
on the grounds that they speak Spanish. 84  He also pointed to the high 
correlation between Spanish-language ability and ethnicity in New York.85 
The Court concluded, however, “we need not address that argument here, 
for the prosecutor did not rely on language ability without more but 
explained that the specific responses and the demeanor of the two 
individuals during voir dire caused him to doubt their ability to defer to the 
official translation of Spanish-language testimony.”86 
                                                                                                                     
79 The Court noted that petitioner and respondent both used the term “Latino” in their 
briefs to the Court but that the amicus brief employed “Hispanic” and that the parties 
used that term to refer to the excluded jurors in the trial court, although no attempt was 
made to distinguish the terms by the parties. In deference to the terminology preferred by 
the parties, the Court opted to use Latino to refer to the excluded jurors. Id. at 355. 
80 Id. 
81 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 139 (1986). 
82 Id. at 96–98. 
83 Hernandez, 500 U.S at 359. 
84 Id. at 360. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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In evaluating the race neutrality of the prosecution’s explanation for the 
exclusion, the Court, relying on Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corporation87 and other relevant authority, held that “official 
action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially 
disproportionate impact. . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or 
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”88 
The Court upheld Hernandez’s conviction, ruling that the state courts did 
not commit clear error and were correct in accepting the prosecutor’s race-
neutral explanation for his exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude 
prospective Latino jurors.89 A critical implication of the Hernandez v. New 
York holding is that language can now serve as proxy for race in excluding 
Latinos from juries. 
B. “We Don’t Allow No ‘Misican’ Talk”: Discrimination in Employment 
While employment discrimination based on race or national origin is 
prohibited under Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act90 and under 
most equivalent state statutes, including the California Fair Employment 
and Housing Act (FEHA),91 language is not a protected category under 
current federal or state law. Because language discrimination is not 
prohibited, employers can reprimand and/or fire people for speaking 
Spanish on the job if they can simply articulate a bono fide business 
necessity for imposing an English-only rule, a low threshold, such as 
improving workplace safety and/or morale.92 Again, as in jury selection, in 
                                                                                                                     
87 Id. at 359–60 
88 Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977). 
89 Hernandez, 500, U.S. at 372. 
90 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1991). 
91 California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900–12996 
(West 2011). 
92 See, e.g., Alfredo Mirandé, “En la Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto es Rey” (“In the Land 
of the Blind, the One-Eyed Person is King”): Bilingualism as a Disability, 26 N.M. L. 
REV. 75 (1996). 
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an employment context, discrimination on the basis of language becomes a 
proxy for racial discrimination. 
One of the first cases to address English-only requirements in an 
employment context was Saucedo v. Well Service, Inc.93 In this case, the 
United States District Court of the Southern District of Texas held that a 
Mexican employee had been subjected to employment discrimination when 
he was fired after speaking two words of Spanish, while his supervisor was 
retained despite the fact that he had engaged in fighting during the same 
incident.94 
At the time he was terminated, Saucedo was working as a floorman for 
Brothers Well Service (“Brothers”), a small business operating “workover 
rigs” near Houston. Though Saucedo’s employment history and work 
record were satisfactory and Brothers did not have an English-only 
employment rule, his immediate supervisor told him that as far as he was 
concerned he could speak any language he wanted to but that the supervisor 
on the rig, Doc Holliday, “didn’t allow any ‘Mesican’ talk.”95 
After he was ordered to bring a large metal part to another Mexican-
American worker, Saucedo uttered two words in Spanish. Holliday 
overheard the conversation and told Saucedo that he had just resigned, 
ordered him to put on his street clothes, and drove him into town.96 The 
court held that the rule prohibiting Spanish clearly had an adverse impact on 
Mexican-American employees and that Brothers failed to prove that there 
was a credible, bona fide, necessity for the rule.97 
In contrast, in another Texas case, Garcia v. Gloor, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of a Mexican-American employee 
who was fired for speaking Spanish in the workplace in violation of his 
                                                                                                                     
93 Saucedo v. Bros. Well. Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
94 Id. at 921. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 920–21. 
97 Id. at 922. 
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employer’s English-only rule.98 Although Hector Garcia was born in Texas, 
he was bilingual and Spanish was his first language.99 Garcia was employed 
as a salesman by Gloor Lumber and Supply Company (“Gloor”) in 
Brownsville, Texas. Despite the fact that seven of the eight salesmen were 
Hispanic and bilingual, and 75 percent of the population in the area of the 
business was Hispanic,100 Gloor felt that the rule was justified for business 
reasons. Gloor had a rule prohibiting employees from speaking Spanish on 
the job unless they were speaking to a Spanish-speaking client.101 Despite 
having a good work record, Garcia was fired after another employee asked 
him about an item requested by a client and he responded in Spanish. He 
was overheard by Alton Gloor, an officer and stockholder in the company, 
and let go. 
The narrow issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit was “whether the 
English-only rule as applied to Mr. Garcia imposed a discriminatory 
condition of employment.”102 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling by the 
lower court denying a class action suit because the class was too small to 
meet the requirement and also concluding that the rule did not  discriminate 
on the basis of national origin.103 
In seeking to interpret the statute, the court did so through a monolingual 
lens. It focused on Garcia’s bilingual ability and concluded that, although he 
was able to speak English, “[h]e chose deliberately to speak Spanish instead 
of English while actually at work,” and he “was permitted to speak the 
language he preferred during work breaks.”104 
In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., KIIS-FM (KISS) in Los Angeles 
similarly fired Valentine Jurado after he was instructed to broadcast only in 
                                                                                                                     
98 Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 267. 
101 Id. at 266. 
102 Id. at 267. 
103 Id. at 266. 
104 Id. at 268. 
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English and allegedly refusing to abide by the request. Jurado was a radio 
announcer of Mexican and Native American descent and a bilingual 
English/Spanish speaker.105 He began working as a disc jockey under the 
name of “Val Valentine” and broadcast in English until, at the request of the 
program director, he began using a few phrases of “street Spanish” in an 
effort to attract more Spanish-speaking listeners. 106  After a consultant 
concluded that the bilingual format actually hurt the radio station’s ratings 
he was directed by the new program director to stop using Spanish on the 
air.107 The parties disagreed as to what happened next, with Jurado claiming 
he was fired and the station saying he quit.108 However, for the purposes of 
Summary Judgment, KIIS admitted Jurado was fired.109  
        Jurado’s race and national origin discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C 
§1981110 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and his claims for 
breach of a collective bargaining agreement under Section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act were denied by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. The court affirmed a lower court Summary Judgment Motion on 
behalf of defendants.111 The court held that the plaintiff had failed to make a 
prima facie disparate treatment case, given that the English-only rule was 
motivated by market conditions rather than racial considerations, and 
because he failed to show that he participated in any activity under Title VII 
that protected against retaliation by an employer. 112  Finally, the court 
rejected Jurado’s only disparate treatment claim that the English-only rule 
somehow disadvantaged Hispanics because “[Jurado] was fully bilingual 
and could easily conform to the order.”113 The court, citing Garcia v. Gloor,  
                                                                                                                     
105 Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1987). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). 
111 Jurado, 813 F.2d. at 1413. 
112 Id. at 1411. 
113 Id. at 1412. 
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concluded that “[a]n employer can properly enforce a limited, reasonable, 
and business-related English-only rule against an employee who can readily 
comply with the rule and who voluntarily chooses not to observe it . . . .”114 
 However, in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
district court had not abused its discretion in entering a preliminary 
injunction enjoining enforcement of an English-only rule imposed by the 
Municipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District of Los Angeles.115 Alva 
Gutierrez was one of several bilingual Latinas employed by the court as 
deputy clerks who were expected to translate for the non-English-speaking 
public.116 However, the court enacted a new personnel rule that prohibited 
employees from using a language other than English outside of their 
capacity as interpreters for the public. 117  The rule was subsequently 
amended to exclude conversations held during employee breaks or lunch.118 
Gutierrez and the other bilingual clerks were upset with the English-only 
rule and Gutierrez filed a complaint with the United States Equal 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She then brought suit against the judges 
of the EEOC adjucication seeking money damages, injunctive relief, and 
attorney fees.119 Gutierrez argued that the English-only rule (1) resulted in 
racial and national origin discrimination and was a violation of Title VII,120 
(2) denied her the right to enter into contracts with White persons in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and (3) denied her the equal protection of the 
law and infringed her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.121 Finally, 
Gutierrez sought damages under 42 U.S.C §§ 1983 and 1985(3).122 
                                                                                                                     
114 Id. at 1411 (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
115 Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 
U.S. 1016 (1989). 
116 Id. at 1036. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1988). 
121 Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036. 
122 Id. at 1037. 
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In addition to holding that Gutierrez was entitled to a preliminary 
injunction, the court held that the municipal judges were not entitled to 
absolute legislative immunity, that the district court had jurisdiction, and 
that qualified immunity was not a defense to a charge of intentional 
discrimination. 123  A Ninth Circuit panel voted to deny a petition for 
rehearing.124 The dissenters objected and maintained that Gutierrez “cried 
out for an en banc consideration” because the panel opinion created a direct 
conflict with the Fifth Circuit opinion in Garcia v. Gloor and the Ninth 
Circuit holding in Jurado.125 
The dissent in Gutierrez would ultimately prevail in Garcia v. Spun Steak 
Co., 126  an opinion written by Ninth Circuit Court Judge Diarmuid 
O’Scannlain, one of the dissenting judges in Gutierrez.127 Spun Steak Co., a 
small South San Francisco producer of frozen poultry and meat products 
offered for wholesale distribution,128 had 24 out of a total of 33 workers 
who were Spanish speakers. Two of the workers spoke no English and the 
rest had “varying degrees of proficiency in English.”129 
The plaintiffs, Priscilla Garcia and Maricela Buitrago, were reprimanded 
for speaking Spanish while working on the production line in violation of a 
recently enacted English-only rule, which prohibited workers from speaking 
Spanish except on their lunch or work breaks.130 The English-only rule was 
implemented after the company received complaints that some workers 
                                                                                                                     
123 Id. 
124 Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 
U.S. 1016 (1989). 
125 Id. at 1188–89. 
126 Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1228 
(1994). 
127 Mirandé, supra note 92, at 83. 
128 Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1483. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
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were allegedly using their “bilingual abilities” to harass and insult other 
workers.131 
The district court held that the English-only policy had an adverse impact 
on Hispanic employees unjustified by a sufficient business necessity and 
was therefore a violation of Title VII.132 Spun Steak Co. appealed and the 
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.133 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
employees who spoke both English and Spanish had failed to show that the 
English-only requirement had a significant adverse impact on the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of their employment.134 Incredibly, the court added 
that plaintiffs had failed to show that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether those employees who did not speak English were 
adversely impacted by the ruling.135 
C. Educational Segregation and Discrimination 
The race/plus model is also relevant for education and for attempts to 
desegregate schools following the landmark decision in Brown.136 Although 
Brown overturned the prevailing “separate but equal” doctrine established 
in Plessy v. Ferguson137 and outlawed racial discrimination and segregation, 
holding that separate educational facilities were inherently unequal and in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, de jure segregation of Mexican students 
continued both before and after Brown. Such segregation was generally 
upheld on the grounds that it was based not on race per se, but on the fact 
                                                                                                                     
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 1484. 
133 Id. at 1490. 
134 Id. at 1485–86. 
135 Id. at 1489. 
136 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 
(1955). 
137 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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that Mexican students had special language and other educational needs,138 
so that, once again, language became a proxy for race. 
Although the legal segregation of Mexican students would be overturned 
in Westminster School Dist. et al. v. Mendez,139 Mexican parents had fought 
against the segregation of Mexican children for decades prior to this historic 
decision, which laid the groundwork for Brown. These efforts were initiated 
in Texas and California in the 1930s.140 One of the desegregation efforts 
occurred in 1930 when Mexican parents challenged the segregation of 
Mexican children in Del Rio, Texas.141  The resulting case, Independent 
School Dist. v. Salvatierra, was therefore significant in challenging the 
racial binary in seeking to determine the constitutionality of the common 
practice of racially segregating Mexican children. The case was important 
for a number of reasons. First, it was significant because the Texas State 
Constitution of 1875, ratified in 1876, permitted the segregation of 
“colored” and “White” children.142 Second, it provided legal precedent for 
subsequent challenges to the segregation of Mexican children.143 Finally, 
the plaintiffs in the case were represented by attorneys representing The 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), a newly formed civil 
rights organization that advocated for the rights of Mexican citizens.144 
The district court in Salvatierra held that the school district could not 
legally segregate Mexican children because they were deemed to be 
“members of the White race.” 145  Although the trial court granted an 
                                                                                                                     
138 See generally Hernandez v. Driscoll, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 329 (1957); Westminster 
Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947). 
139 Westminster Sch. Dist., 161 F.2d 774. 
140 RICHARD R. VALENCIA, CHICANO SCHOOL FAILURE AND SUCCESS: PAST, PRESENT, 
AND FUTURE 87 (2d ed. 2002). 
141 See generally Independent Sch. Dist. v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1930). 
142 VALENCIA, supra note 140. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
976 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
LATCRIT 2013: RESISTANCE RISING 
injunction preventing the district from segregating Mexican children, the 
Texas Court of Civil Appeals overturned the lower court, holding that the 
district did not intentionally and arbitrarily segregate Mexican children by 
race given that the children had special language needs and that the school 
district had the authority to segregate children on educational grounds.146 
Although largely unknown, Alvarez v. Lemon Grove was the first 
successful desegregation case in the United States147 and took place some 
25 years before Brown v. Board of Education. On January 5, 1931, 
Principal Jerome Green, acting under instructions from Lemon Grove 
School trustees, literally turned away Mexican school children at the school 
house door and directed them to a new school. This school came to be 
known within the local Mexican community as la caballeriza (the stable).148 
The parents refused to send their children to the new school and, since 
they were not admitted to the main schoolhouse, a boycott and lawsuit 
ensued. Mexican parents came together to form El Comite de Vecinos de 
Lemon Grove (The Lemon Grove Neighborhood Committee) and organized 
a successful boycott of the school, ordering their children not to attend the 
new school. Eventually, with the support of the Mexican Consul the parents 
brought a successful suit in the San Diego Superior Court. 
Judge Claude Chambers of the San Diego Superior Court ruled that 
separate facilities impeded the language development of Spanish-speaking 
students. Additionally, he held that the school board did not have the right 
to segregate Mexican children because they were Caucasian and California 
law had no provision for their segregation, although state statutes allowed 
for the segregation of African American and Indian children. 149  Judge 
Chambers ruled against the Lemon Grove School District and ordered them 
                                                                                                                     
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 87–88. 
149 Chapter 7: La Lucha: The Beginnings of the Struggle, 1920-1930s, SAN DIEGO 
MEXICAN & CHICANO HISTORY, http://aztlan.sdsu.edu/chicanohistory/chapter07/c07s02. 
html  (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). 
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to reinstate the children in the regular school.150 Although Lemon Grove 
was an important ruling for Mexican Americans, it failed to challenge the 
racial binary and de jure racial segregation.151 In fact, it “had no precedent-
setting ruling affecting either the State of California or other situations of 
school segregation in the Southwest.”152 
In the landmark case of Westminster School Dist. of Orange County et al. 
v. Mendez et. al.,153 some seven years before Brown, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals overturned the segregation of Mexican children, ruling that such 
segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court reasoned that 
Mexicans were “Caucasian” and the California statute at issue did not 
specifically permit the segregation of Mexican students. In Mendez, the 
parents in the Westminster School District brought suit alleging that a 
common plan had been adopted and put into effect by the School District 
and common rules and regulations had been adopted and implemented. The 
parents alleged that, as a result, “‘petitioners and all others of Mexican and 
Latin descent’” [we]re ‘barred, precluded and denied’ [from] ‘attending and 
using and receiving the benefits and education furnished to other children,’ 
and [we]re segregated in schools ‘attended solely by children of [M]exican 
and Latin descent.’”154 Petitioners further argued that they “and others in the 
same situation have objected, and they have demanded and have been 
refused admission to schools within their respective districts which they 
would attend but for the practice of segregation.”155 
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court ruling and 
found that  
                                                                                                                     
150 Id. 
151 VALENCIA, supra note 140, at 88. 
152 Roberto Álvarez, Jr., The Lemon Grove Incident: The Nation’s First Successful 
Desegregation Court Case, 32 J. SAN DIEGO HIST., 116, 116–35 (1986), available at 
http://www.sandiegohistory.org/journal/86spring/lemongrove.htm. 
153 Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 774 (9th Cir. 1947). 
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the acts of respondents were and are entirely without authority of 
California law, notwithstanding their performance has been and is 
under color or pretense of California law. Therefore, conceding for 
the argument that California could legally enact a law authorizing 
the segregation as practiced, the fact stands out unchallengeable 
that California has not done so but to the contrary has enacted laws 
wholly inconsistent with such practice. By enforcing the 
segregation of school children of Mexican descent against their 
will and contrary to the laws of California, respondents have 
violated the federal law as provided in the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Federal Constitution by depriving them of liberty and 
property without due process of law and by denying to them the 
equal protection of the laws.156 
Although not directly addressing segregation, in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Texas system for financing public education based on local property taxes 
as constitutionally permitted and not a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause because education, while important, was not a fundamental right.157 
It also held that even though over 90 percent of the school district at issue 
was made up of minorities and was about 86 percent Mexican, the 
distinction between levels of school funding was based on economic status 
and not directly on race.158 
D. Alienage: “The Mexican Exception” to the Fourth Amendment 
In an immigration context, the Supreme Court held in United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, that “Mexican appearance” or being “Mexican-looking” is 
one of a number of legitimate factors that can be used by law enforcement 
in stopping people, without intruding on the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.159 The issue before 
                                                                                                                     
156 Id. at 780-81. 
157 See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
158 In another important Texas case, the Supreme Court held that the denial of a public 
education to the children of undocumented workers was unconstitutional and a violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
159 See generally United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
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the Supreme Court was whether a roving patrol may legally stop a vehicle 
and question its occupants when the only basis for the stop is that the 
occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry.160  
The decision in Brignoni-Ponce had the effect of limiting the authority of 
Border Patrol agents to question people in the vicinity of the border.161 
Except at the border or its functional equivalent, officers on a roving patrol 
may stop vehicles “only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, 
together with rational inferences from those facts that reasonably warrant 
suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the 
country.”162 A number of factors may be taken into account in deciding 
whether there is reasonable suspicion, such as information about recent 
illegal border crossings in the area, the driver’s behavior, driving patterns, 
and obvious attempts to avoid detection.163 The Court concluded, however, 
that “the likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is 
high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing 
alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are 
aliens.”164 While the Court held that a stop could not be justified solely on 
the basis of Mexican appearance, it made “Mexican appearance” one of a 
number of factors that can constitutionally be used to establish reasonable 
suspicion for stopping a vehicle in a roving patrol. 
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte et al., the Supreme Court 
distinguished between roving patrols and fixed checkpoints.165 The Court 
held that the Border Patrol’s routine stopping of a vehicle at a permanent 
checkpoint located on a major highway away from the Mexican border for 
brief questioning of the vehicle’s occupants is consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. Additionally, the Court held that immigration stops and 
questioning may be made at reasonably located checkpoints in the absence 
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of any individualized suspicion that the particular vehicle contains illegal 
aliens, although such a stop is technically a de minimis intrusion of the 
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.166  
In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the decision virtually empties 
the Fourth Amendment of its reasonableness requirement,167 adding that  
[e]very American citizen of Mexican ancestry, and every Mexican 
alien lawfully in this country, must know after today's decision that 
he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at the risk of being 
subjected not only to a stop, but also to detention and interrogation, 
both prolonged and to an extent far more than for non-Mexican 
appearing motorists.168 
Thus, both Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuertes had the effect of making 
“Mexican appearance” a constitutionally permissible basis for making an 
immigration stop to question the occupants of a vehicle both at fixed 
checkpoints and on roving patrols. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In applying the race/plus model to Jalos migrants, it is clear that despite 
the fact that they tend to be more fair-skinned than many Mexican migrants, 
Jalos migrants and Mexicanos and Latinas/os are still subjected to 
discrimination that is based not only on race or skin color, but also on other 
factors, such as language, real or perceived immigration status, or simply 
because they are deemed to be “Mexican looking” or “illegal.” Many people 
in the study commented on how they were disadvantaged because they were 
not fluent in English or because they entered the United States “cruzando el 
cerro” (without papers). Despite being extremely religious and tied to the 
Catholic Church, others shared that they had experienced discrimination 
against Spanish speakers in their local parish. 
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Because of the impact of CRT and cultural studies, the narratives of 
previously excluded groups are now being slowly incorporated into law and 
social science.169 Any paradigm that seeks to understand the experience of 
Mexicans and Latinas/os in the United States must not only incorporate 
insider narratives, but also reject monolithic conceptions of Chicana/Latina 
culture and identity that fail to take into account nationality, gender, sexual 
orientation, and the regional and generational diversity of the Mexicans and 
other Latinas/os in the United States. 
There has been a challenge to the traditional immigrant model, which 
treated people as either immigrants or natives, and a growing awareness of a 
multinational border culture with an emergent transnational experience and 
identity, or what some have identified as a unique third space between the 
sending and receiving nation states. A related need is full recognition of the 
diversity of the Latina/o population in terms of race, place of birth, 
citizenship, and immigration status. This increased interest in immigration 
and immigrant rights issues has been coupled with a growing realization 
that the fate of Chicanas/os and Latinas/os who are native-born or 
naturalized citizens is inextricably linked to the treatment of immigrants.170 
The quest for civil rights has been expanded to include not only 
citizenship rights, but also cultural and linguistic rights, or what has been 
termed “cultural citizenship.”171 However, there is an interesting disjuncture 
between “cultural rights” and “citizenship rights.” As Renato Rosaldo has 
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observed, cultural rights and citizenship rights tend to be inversely related 
so that as one increases, the other decreases. In this sense, “[f]ull citizens 
lack culture, and those most culturally endowed lack full citizenship.”172 
Finally, I submit that any adequate conception of race and racism must 
reject the prevailing Black/White binary model in law and the social 
sciences, and recognize not only the racial diversity of Chicanas/os and 
Latinas/os, but also that we are subjected to discrimination that is based not 
only on race, but on language, culture, and real or perceived alienage status. 
We must also call into question idealist and color-blind conceptions of race, 
which treat race either as an epiphenomenon, lacking any causal influence, 
or contend that we somehow promote racism by incorporating the analytical 
concept of race into our discourse. While we should move toward a 
structural view of race and racism, must simultaneously resist the 
temptation to adopt a concept of race that focuses exclusively on social 
structure and denies any sense of agency or control to the individual. 
 
    
                                                                                                                     
172 RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE & TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 198 
(1989). 
